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Wilson and Adhead‟s plea that the British Government‟s proposed new mental health 
legislation might entail a misappropriation of psychiatry‟s true mission will strike a 
chord in numerous jurisdictions.  Many European countries during the last northern 
summer will adopt mental legislation that moves in the opposite direction to the 
United Nations Convention on Human Rights for persons with disabilities, and will 
allow for compulsory mental health treatment.  In this author‟s home state of Victoria, 
Australia, the Mental Health Act has five criteria which must be met for someone to 
be made an involuntary patient - in an institution or hospital, in the community, or in 
one‟s home (Victoria, 2003, s.6).  One of the criteria is that the person is judged to be 
at risk of danger to themselves or others.  Once made an involuntary patient one 
looses the right to refuse medical treatment.  At present, in various parts of the world, 
medical practitioners are being required to assess a person‟s level of dangerousness 
with immediate consequences for that person‟s liberty.     
 From the point of view of a historian of the human sciences, this event propels 
psychiatry into a dialogue with its recent past.  The project of Western psychiatry is 
usually characterised as a breaking down of the walls of the old asylum that contained 
the lunatic in its dark recesses, and the subsequent unveiling of the mental patient 
thanks to the rational, liberatory practices of medicine.  But modern psychiatry has 
also been shaped by the coming into being of particular conceptions of mental illness.  
This entailed the removal over time of the mental defective and the mental deficient, 
the moral imbecile, the epileptic, the alcoholic and the chronically insane, and so on, 
from spaces in which psychiatry would seek to define it object - populations that 
psychiatry would determine to be „not amenable to treatment‟.  If we were to see this 
shaping in a Foucauldian sense, we would also want to include earlier 18th and 19th 
century separation of the lunatic and the criminal (Foucault, 1965; Foucault, 1979).  
Moreover, we might want to insist that the marking out of the modern mental health 
patient is first and foremost an administrative act - an act of separation and 
management within a bounded population - which then serves as a condition of 
possibility for the emergence of knowledges in psychiatric medicine, with the latter 
following rather than preceding the arrangement of bodies in the asylum.   
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 The psychiatrist in public medicine may well be required to shape a new 
mission according to the requirements of an administration concerned with managing 
dangerousness.  A shift in the social vocation of the psychiatric expert has been 
observed over several decades, and may represent a profound departure from the 
traditions of mental medicine (Castel, 1991).  Those „dirty words‟ - risk assessment - 
involve new strategies where face-to-face relations between carer and cared are 
displaced by an activity of calculating abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk - 
„a transition from the clinic of the subject to an “epidemiological” clinic‟ (Castel, 
1991, 282).  The broad contours of this shift sees the specialist medical carer take a 
back seat while the manager / administrator assumes a more autonomous role of 
allocating individuals into various categories of risk.  It is in this sense that the 
psychiatrist does not make a diagnosis as such, but rather contributes to a list of 
factors compiled in order to measure a level of riskiness.  Risk assessment forms part 
of social surveillance that dispenses with the actual presence of the carer and the cared 
and provides for a form of systematic predetection, rather than treatment.  As Castel 
(1991, 288) presents it 
(t)here is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject because 
there is no longer a subject. What the new preventative policies primarily 
address is no longer individuals but factors, statistical correlations of 
heterogeneous elements.  They deconstruct the concrete subject of 
intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk.  
Their primary aim is not to confront a concrete a concrete dangerous situation, 
but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger. „Prevention‟ in 
effect promotes suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of 
probabilities. 
 Much of the early colonial legislation throughout Australia was modelled on 
the New South Wales Dangerous Lunatics Act (1843) which established reception 
house for „dangerous lunatics‟ and „dangerous idiots‟.  The former was one defined as 
needing safe custody especially for the sake of prevention of crime, including suicide. 
The Act also functioned to limit its application, in the sense that it prohibited 
constables from dragging every idiot son out of the farmhouse kitchen.  
Dangerousness had lingered since the invention of the asylum, but it has progressively 
shifted to the periphery of the space where the project of modern psychiatry takes 
shape.  In the early 19
th
 century, for example, the gradual removal of mechanical 
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restraint helped to produce a new category of person in the institution – the mental 
patient – while at the same time the dangerous or refractory patient came to be placed 
at the outer edge, sometimes with the use of cells, at some distance from the main 
work of the asylum, in the borderland of medicine proper.  Later in the century the 
incurable and the imbecile were moved to other sites partly as a consequence of the 
appearance of the Receiving House, which had replaced the gaol as the main 
administrative arm of separation and management. In early 20
th
 century Australia, 
modelling on developments in the United Kingdom, reception houses and wards 
became place for the observation of the „doubtful insane‟ and for early treatment; the 
„mental hospital‟ separated from „hospital for the insane‟ (the old asylum) became a 
place for the chronic and was repositioned conceptually and geographically on the 
periphery of medical practice (McCallum, 2001).  
 As already suggested, the kinds of separating practices that gave psychiatry its 
modern object of inquiry defy any linear model of progressive enlightenment.  In the 
formal interactions between medicine and law, the appearance of new categories of 
person tend to problematise the object of psychiatry and its historical contingency.  
The Butler Report in England in 1975 recommended changes to the provisions 
originally laid down in the Mental Health Act (1959), where in the UK the term 
„psychopathic disorder‟ first appeared.  Changes were recommended including 
abandonment of the term psychopath and replacing it with „personality disorder‟.  The 
recommendations came to nought, but problems persisted.  Many psychiatrists then 
(as now) declared that personality disorders were not a treatable mental illness (Dell, 
1984, 66; Ashworth and Shapland, 1980. 679).  The United States experienced related 
sets of concerns around the successful plea of insanity by John Hinckley, would-be 
assassin of President Reagan, who had used the American Penal Code test (known as 
ALI) for insanity which gradually supplanted the McNaghten test.  The ALI came into 
its own in the 1960s and 1970s based on an increased confidence that psychiatry and 
psychology had made volition knowable and testable, in both science and law (US 
House of Representatives, 1983, 30).  In Australia, in a landmark case (Attorney-
General v. David), a mental health review board had refused to rule that a prisoner 
was mentally ill, but rather determined that he suffered from anti-social personality 
disorder. The Victorian State government then enacted the Community Protection Act 
(1990) giving the Supreme Court power to detain one individual beyond the 
expiration of his sentence.       
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